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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
It is respondents' position that plaintiff's Notice of 
Appeal in this action was untimely and that the Supreme 
Court (and therefore the Utah Court of Appeals, to which 
this case was transferred under § 78-2a-3(2)(h), Utah Code 
Annotated) has no jurisdiction over the attempted appeal of 
the court's summary judgment of dismissal entered on January 
30, 1987. 
Any jurisdiction in this Court would necessarily be 
limited to a consideration of the trial court's denial of 
plaintiff's motion for new trial, such jurisdiction deriving 
from the Supreme Court's original appellate jurisdiction 
under § 78-2-2 (3) (i), Utah Code Annotated, and Rule 4(a), 
R. Utah S.Ct. 
v 

NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
Opposing parties filed Motions for Summary Judgment. 
After considering Memoranda filed by both parties upon 
positions that there were no material facts in dispute, the 
Court granted Defendant's Motion. Plaintiff then filed a 
Motion for a New Trial, which was denied upon the trial 
court's conclusion that there was no basis under Rule 59 of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to grant a new trial, when 
no trial had been held, and upon the further holding that, 
in any event, there was no basis under Rule 59 or Rule 60 of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to set aside the Summary 
Judgment granted by the trial court. The Plaintiff then 
filed its Notice of Appeal, appealing the decision of the 
trial court denying its Motion for a New Trial. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Defendants submit the following as issues on appeal: 
1. May the Plaintiff properly seek reversal of a 
Summary Judgment by a Motion for a New Trial? 
2. Does an improper Motion for a New Trial extend the 
time to file a Notice of Appeal from the entry of a Summary 
Judgment? 
3. Should the Plaintiff be allowed to file a Motion 
for a New Trial and claim there are disputed facts after the 
entry of Summary Judgment when it had conceded there were no 
facts in dispute in arguments on the Motion for Summary 
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Judgment? 
4. When the granting of a Summary Judgment is based 
on three (3) separate grounds, each of which independently 
justifies the judgment, should the judgment be reversed if 
one of the grounds is not sustainable on appeal? 
5. Should Plaintiff be entitled to forfeiture of 
Defendant's bid bond when Defendant's bid contained an 
error, made in good faith, which error was known by the 
Plaintiff and immediately brought to Plaintiff's attention 
by Defendant upon discovery by Defendant? 
6. Is the Plaintiff entitled to collect money under a 
bid bond when Plaintiff has incurred no damages? 
7. Is the Plaintiff entitled to enforce forfeiture of 
a bid bond when it did not comply with the conditions 
precedent set forth on the bid and the bond? 
STATUTES INVOLVED 
Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure: 
(c) The motion shall be served at least 10 days 
before the time fixed for the hearing. The 
adverse party prior to the day of hearing may 
serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought 
shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, 
if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and that the moving party is 
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A 
summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may 
be rendered on the issue of liability alone 
although there is a genuine issue as to the amount 
of damages. 
(e) Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be 
2 
made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such 
facts as would be admissible in evidence, and 
shall show affirmatively that the affiant is 
competent to testify to the matters stated 
therein. Sworn or certified copies of all papers 
or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall 
be attached thereto or served therewith. The 
court may permit affidavits to be supplemented or 
opposed by depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, or further affidavits. When a 
motion for summary judgment is made and supported 
as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not 
rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his 
pleadings, but his response, by affidavits or as 
otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth 
specific facts showing that there is a genuine 
issue for trial. If he does not so respond, 
summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered 
against him. 
Rule 2.8 of the Rules of Practice of ±.he Seventh 
Judicial District Court: 
(d) The points and authorities in support of a 
motion for summary judgment shall begin with a 
section that contains a concise statement of 
material facts as to which movant contends no 
genuine issue exists. The facts shall be stated 
in separate numbered sentences and shall refer 
with particularity to those portions of the record 
upon which movant relies. 
(e) The points and authorities in opposition to a 
motion for summary judgment shall begin with a 
section that contains a concise statement of 
material facts as to which the party contends a 
genuine issue exists. Each fact in dispute shall 
be stated in separate numbered sentences and shall 
refer with particularity to those portions of the 
record upon which the opposing party relies, and, 
if applicable, shall state the numbered sentence 
or sentences of the movant's facts that are 
disputed. All material facts set forth in the 
statement of the movant shall be deemed admitted 
for the purpose of summary judgment unless 
specifically controverted by the statement of the 
opposing party. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff filed this action seeking forfeiture of a bid 
bond furnished by contractor/principal Ultrasystems Western 
Constructors, Inc., (Ultrasystems) and Industrial Indemnity 
Company, its surety. Following discovery, Ultrasystems and 
Industrial Indemnity filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on 
November 10, 1986. (R. 336, 410, addendum 1) The Motion 
sought a judgment dismissing the Complaint for no cause of 
action, on three separate grounds. (1) That an error in 
Ultrasystems1 bid was made in good faith, justified 
Ultrasystems withdrawal of its bid, and that equity should 
prevent forfeiture of the bid bond, State vs. Union 
Construction Company, 339 P.2d 421 (Utah 1959); (2) that 
Plaintiff had incurred no damages, Petrovitch vs. City of 
Arcadia, 222 P.2d 231 (Cal. 1950); and (3) that Plaintiff 
had in any event failed to fulfill all the conditions 
precedent for the bond to take effect. 
Pursuant to Rule 2.8 of the Rules of Practice of the 
Seventh Judicial District Court, Ultrasystems submitted a 
list of undisputed facts upon which the Defendants were 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (R. 339) 
Ultrasystems also filed supporting affidavits. (R. 355, 
360) At the request of Plaintiff's counsel, Defendants 
stipulated in writing to an extension of time to December 
10, 1986 for Plaintiff to file any Opposing Memorandum. (R. 
4 
413) On December 10, 1986 Plaintiff filed its Opposing 
Memorandum agreeing that Defendants1 list of facts were 
undisputed, but arguing that Plaintiff was entitled to 
Summary Judgment. (R. 416) Ultrasysterns responded to 
Defendants1 Motion on December 17, 1986 (R. 434) and 
requested a ruling on the Motions. On December 19, 1986 the 
Plaintiff filed an Addendum to its Memorandum in Opposition 
(R. 441) , followed by a December 24 Response to 
Ultrasystems1 Reply Memorandum. (R. 443) On January 15, 
1987 the Court, by Minute Entry, granted Defendants1 Motion 
for Summary Judgment, (R. 448) and entered Judgment on 
January 30, 1987. (R. 468 Addendum 2) 
Plaintiff responded by a Motion for a New Trial, (R. 
479) filed with a Memorandum (R. 471) and Affidavits. (R. 
449, 459, 473) The Court, by Minute Entry, denied the 
Motion for New Trial on March 10, 1987 (R. 504 Addendum 3) 
and on March 27, 1987 signed the Order denying the Motion 
for New Trial. (R.512, Addendum 4) On March 18, 1987 
Plaintiff filed its Notice of Appeal of the Court's Minute 
Entry of March 10, 1987 denying the Motion for a New Trial. 
(R. 511) 
The facts underlying the present appeal are summarized 
in the statement of undisputed facts contained in 
Ultrasystems' Memorandum in Support of its Motion for 
Summary Judgment. (R. 339) These facts were submitted in 
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separate numbered sentences and referred to the portions of 
the record which supported those facts as required by Rule 
2.8(d), Those facts, undisputed by Plaintiff, are as 
follows: 
1. Ultrasystems is a construction company involved in 
various construction projects throughout the United States. 
2. The Plaintiff, Moon Lake Electric, is a rural 
electric cooperative. (R. 514 Winder deposition page 4, 
line 20) 
3. In 1985 Moon Lake Electric proposed to construct 
for Chevron, an electrical substation near Rangely, 
Colorado. That substation is known as the Rooks California 
Substation. (R. 515 Hunt deposition pages 3 and 4) 
4. The bidding and construction of the substation 
involved three (3) phases. The phase which is the subject 
of this action was the construction of the superstructure 
and above ground facilities. (R. 515 Hunt deposition page 
6) 
5. Ultrasystems was not on the original list of 
bidders for the erection of the superstructure. At the 
request of Mike Chambers, a project manager for 
Ultrasystems, Ultrasystems was furnished copies of the bid 
documents. (R. 515 Hunt deposition pages 9 and 10) 
6. The bid documents provided to Ultrasystems by Moon 
Lake included a letter dated August 27, 1985, blueprints and 
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a document entitled Contractor's Proposal. Hunt deposition 
page 11. The August 27, 1985 letter and the Contractor's 
Proposal are attached as Exhibits "A" and "B" to Allred 
Affidavit. (R. 360, 364, 366) 
7. The documentation was provided to Mr. Richard 
Armstead of Ultrasystems for preparation of the bid. (R. 
355 Armstead Affidavit) 
8. Based upon Mr. Armstead fs review of the 
construction drawings he determined that the conductors, bus 
bars and terminals could be connected by various methods, 
including bolting, coupling or welding. Mr. Armstead 
determined from the documents that it was up to the bidder 
as to the type of coupling to be used. Mr. Armstead 
therefore prepared the bid planning on using bolting and 
coupling to make the connections. Mr. Armsteadfs specialty 
is electrical work. He is not familiar with welding, 
particularly aluminum welding and the additional costs and 
expense of aluminum welding. (R. 355 Armstead Affidavit) 
9. Bolting or other methods of connection other than 
welding are acceptable methods for connecting conductors, 
bus bars and terminals. However, it was the intent of Moon 
Lake that the conductors, bus bars and terminals be 
connected using aluminum welding. (R. 515 Hunt deposition 
page 38) 
10. The blueprints, except in a few limited instances, 
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do not refer to how the conductors, bus bars and terminals 
are to be connected. The reference to welding is in the 
materials list. (R. 515 Hunt deposition page 37, R. 355 
Armstead Affidavit) 
11. Based upon his understanding that the conductors, 
bus bars and terminals could be connected by bolting rather 
than welding, Mr. Armstead submitted Ultrasystems bid in the 
amount of TWO HUNDRED THIRTEEN THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED 
DOLLARS ($213,300.00). That bid was submitted September 12, 
1985. (R. 355 Armstead Affidavit) The bid as submitted is 
Exhibit "B" to Allred Affidavit. (R. 360, 366) 
12. In addition to Ultrasystems bid, four (4) other 
bids were received for the substation. Those bids were by 
Thiel, TIC, Lamb Engineering and ESS. The bids were broken 
down in units, being Units A through 0. The error on 
Ultrasystems bid was in Unit A. The total bid and the bid 
on Unit A for the five bidders are as follows: (Copies of 
the bids are attached as Exhibits "OF" of Allred Affidavit 
R. 360, 396) 
BIDDER TOTAL BID UNIT A 
Ultrasystems $213,300.00 $ 51,400.00 
Thiel $314,800.00 $115,315.00 
TIC $396,637.00 $211,677.00 
Lamb Engineering $410,924.00 $169,079.00 
ESS $419,692.00 $204,708.00 
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13. In addition to the bid, each bidder, pursuant to 
the request of the August 27, 1985 letter, furnished a bid 
bond. A copy of Ultrasystems bid bond is Exhibit "G" to the 
Allred Affidavit. (R. 360, 405) 
14. The bids were reviewed by Mr. Hunt and Mr. Winder 
on September 12 and 13, 1985. A review of those bids 
indicated that Ultrasystems had the apparent low bid. Mr. 
Hunt contacted Ultrasystems with two (2) questions he had 
regarding the bid. One question related to the per unit 
cost of control cable in Unit K of the bid and the other 
question related to the manner in which the columns had been 
filled out in Ultrasystems1 bid. (R. 515 Hunt deposition 
pages 18 and 19) 
15. On September 19, 1985, Moon Lake scheduled a 
meeting with Ultrasystems. The purpose of the meeting was 
for Moon Lake to become acquainted with Ultrasystems and its 
personnel, to assist Moon Lake in making a determination on 
awarding the bid. (R. 514 Winder deposition pages 16 
through 19) 
16. Mr. Hunt was aware that the Ultrasystems bid on 
Units A and B was low. On September 24, 1985, Mr. Hunt 
informed Mr. Chambers that Ultrasystems' bid on Units A and 
B was very low. (R. 445 Chambers Affidavit, R. 515 Hunt 
deposition pages 24 and 29) 
17. Mr. Chambers relayed that information to Mr. 
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Armstead. Mr. Armstead then met with other construction 
personnel of Ultrasystems to review the bid to determine if 
there was a problem. After reviewing the bid, it was 
determined that Mr. Armstead had made an error and that Moon 
Lake had intended to have the conductors, bus bars and 
terminals welded. The costs of welding is substantially 
higher than connecting those items by bolting. The bid 
which had been submitted by Ultrasystems had been kept low 
in an effort by Ultrasystems to establish itself with 
Chevron and Moon Lake. The cost for aluminum welding would 
be an additional SEVENTY-FIVE THOUSAND DOLLARS ($75,000.00) 
which would cause a substantial loss to Ultrasystems. (R. 
355 Armstead Affidavit) 
18. Immediately upon determining the mistake and the 
loss which would be caused tc Ultrasystems, a letter was 
prepared to Moon Lake stating the mistake and offering to do 
the work as bid if Moon Lake would pay the actual costs of 
SEVENTY-FIVE THOUSAND DOLLARS ($75,000.00) for the aluminum 
welding. Exhibit "I" to Allred Affidavit. (R. 360, 408) 
19. On September 25, 1985, Mr. Armstead and Mr. 
Chambers met with Mr. Hunt and at the meeting Ultrasystems 
delivered to Mr. Hunt its letter outlining the mistake in 
the bid. At that time, Mr. Hunt delivered to Mr. Armstead 
and Mr. Chambers notice from Moon Lake accepting the bid. 
The form, however, stated that the acceptance was subject to 
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the approval of the administrator (Rural Electric 
Administration). (Armstead Affidavit R. 355 Hunt deposition 
pages 27 and 20) Copies of Ultrasystems letter and Moon 
Lake's acceptance are attached as Exhibits "I" and "J" to 
Allred Affidavit. (R. 360, 408, 409) 
20. On September 26, 1985, Mr. Hunt and Mr. Winder met 
with other representatives of Moon Lake and Chevron and 
determined to award the bid to the next highest bidder and 
to seek forfeiture of Ultrasystems bid bond. (Hunt 
deposition page 32) 
21. The next highest bidder, Thiel, was contacted on 
September 26, 1985. Moon Lake agreed to pay Thiel FIFTEEN 
THOUSAND DOLLARS ($15,000.00) in addition to the amount bid 
by Thiel. Thiel started work on October 3, 1985. (Winder 
deposition pages 28 and 29) 
22. Moon Lake has a contract with Chevron regarding 
the construction of the substation. That contract provides 
that Chevron was to be the owner of the substation and that 
Chevron was to reimburse Moon Lake for all costs and 
expenses incurred in the construction of the substation. 
Pursuant to that contract, Chevron has paid to Moon Lake the 
contract price paid to Thiel, including the additional 
FIFTEEN THOUSAND DOLLARS ($15,000.00) and Chevron has paid 
to Moon Lake all wages, costs and expenses including 
overhead for Moon Lake employees on the project and has paid 
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Moon Lake for any interest incurred on monies paid by Moon 
Lake which was reimbursed by Chevron. Moon Lake has no 
out-of-pocket costs which have not been reimbursed by 
Chevron. (Winder deposition pages 31 and 33, Hunt 
deposition page 33) 
23. Moon Lake has no facts that would show that Mr. 
Armstead on behalf of Ultrasystems did not make a good faith 
mistake when he submitted the bid, and that upon 
ascertaining his mistake did not give prompt notice to Moon 
Lake. (Hunt deposition page 39, Winder deposition pages 25 
and 30) 
24. The bid bond submitted by Ultrasystems provides 
that neither principal nor surety is bound until the 
contractor, Moon Lake, furnishes evidence that financing 
that has been firmly committed to the entire cost of the 
project. No evidence was ever submitted to the Defendants 
that financing had been committed for the entire cost of the 
project. (Hunt deposition page 33, Winder deposition pages 
31 through 37) 
25. The error on Ultrasystems1 bid was a good faith 
mistake, was a result of Mr. Armstead1s lack of expertise 
regarding welding and his failure to determine from the 
construction drawings that Moon Lake intended to have the 
superstructure joined by welding rather than other 
acceptable method. (R. 355 Armstead Affidavit) 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. A Summary Judgment is a final order. Plaintiff's 
Motion for a New Trial was an improper means to seek a 
reversal of the Summary Judgment, and did not toll the time 
to appeal the Summary Judgment. As Plaintiff's Notice of 
Appeal was filed more than 30 days after entry of the 
Summary Judgment, this Court has no jurisdiction and the 
appeal should be dismissed. 
2. Rule 2.8 of the Rules of Practice of the District 
Court and Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
require a party opposing a Motion for Summary Judgment to 
set forth, in writing, specific material facts that are in 
dispute. The Plaintiff admitted the facts relied on by the 
Defendants in their Motion for Summary judgment, and in fact 
claimed that it was entitled to Summary Judgment, in its 
favor, on those same facts. Only after the trial court 
granted Defendant's Motion did the Plaintiff file Affidavits 
claiming for the first time that facts were in dispute. 
Plaintiff did not, in its Motion for a New Trial nor in its 
brief before the trial court, set forth specific disputed 
facts, but rather has made unsupported conclusory 
allegations. 
3. The trial court granted Defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment on three (3) separate, independent 
grounds. Plaintiff now contends that there are facts in 
13 
dispute on one of those grounds • Even if there were 
disputed facts as to one of the basis relied on by the 
court, the remaining two (2) reasons for granting the 
Judgment remain unchallenged, valid and independently 
sufficient for the Judgment. 
4. The purpose of a bid bond is to protect the 
Plaintiff against any damages incurred if the successful 
bidder wrongfully withdraws its bid. Ultrasystems, acting 
in good faith, made an honest mistake in its bid, gave 
prompt notice of the error to Plaintiff, and Plaintiff 
incurred no loss. Plaintiff was reimbursed for all cost of 
building the structure and any other costs associated with 
Ultrasystems' error, and therefore, has suffered no damages. 
Equity and the law of this State do not allow forfeiture 
under these circumstances. 
14 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
A MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL IS NOT A PROPER METHOD TO 
SEEK REVERSAL OF A SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DOES NOT 
EXTEND THE TIME PERIOD TO APPEAL THE SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT, 
Plaintiff originally appealed from the trial court's 
March 10, 1987 ruling denying Plaintiff's Motion for New 
Trial. (R. 505) Plaintiff has apparently abandoned that 
challenge in favor of an argument against the court's 
granting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiff 
did not timely appeal the Court's decision for Summary 
Judgment and its present appeal should be restricted to a 
question of whether the Motion for New Trial was appropriate 
and whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying 
that Motion. 
Rule 58(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides 
that the trial court may grant a new trial for one of seven 
(7) causes listed therein. The Motion must be filed within 
ten (10) days after entry of the judgment and must be 
supported by affidavits setting forth specific facts which 
support one of the grounds set forth in Rule 59. Tangaro 
vs. Marrero, 373 P.2d 390 (Utah 1962) 
The trial court signed the Summary Judgment on January 
30, 1987. Plaintiff filed its Motion for a New Trial on 
February 7, 1987. On March 10, 1987 the court entered its 
ruling denying Plaintiff's Rule 59 Motion. (R. 504) 
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The Summary Judgment entered by the trial court on 
January 30, 1987 was a final, appealable order. There is no 
provision under either Rule 59 or Rule 5 6 for challenging a 
Summary Judgment. The language of Rule 59 in fact assumes 
that a Motion for New Trial follows a trial. Defendants 
have been unable to locate any law in Utah that would 
support an argument that one may file a Motion for a New 
Trial to challenge the granting of a Summary Judgment. The 
ruling by the trial court that there was no basis under Rule 
5 9 for the granting of a Motion for a New Trial was 
appropriate as a matter of law. It follows that the Motion 
did not toll the period for Plaintiff's appeal. 
In Burgers vs. Maiben, 652 P.2d 1320 (Utah 1982) the 
Supreme Court held that an improper Motion for a New Trial 
does not extend the time in which to file a Notice of 
Appeal. Judgment in the instant case was signed and entered 
on January 30, 1987. Plaintiff had 30 days from January 30, 
19 87 to appeal the Summary Judgment, and failed to do so. 
This Court therefore, has no jurisdiction to consider this 
appeal to the extent Plaintiff seeks a reversal of the 
Summary Judgment. 
As to the limited issue of the propriety of the Court's 
denial of Plaintiff's Motion fo a New Trial, there is no 
record basis for the present appeal. 
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POINT II 
PLAINTIFF SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO RAISE LATE 
"ISSUES OF FACT" AFTER INITIALLY ARGUING THAT IT 
WAS ENTITLED TO A SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE NO 
MATERIAL FACTS WERE IN DISPUTE, 
Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure enables 
the trial court to grant judgment as a matter of law when it 
is apparent that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact. Rule 56(e) requires that specific facts 
offered as undisputed, be set forth, based on personal 
knowledge, admissible at trial and be material to the 
applicable rule of law. Norton vs. Bl£ckham, 669 P. 2d 857 
(Utah 1983) and Regan Outdoor Advertising, Inc., vs. 
Lundgren, 692 P.2d 776 (Utah 1984) Opinions and conclusions 
are not sufficient to create an issue of fact. Webster vs. 
Sill, 675 P.2d 1170 (Utah 1983) If a party fails to file 
opposing affidavits the trial court can conclude that there 
is no genuine issue of fact. Any issues that are raised in 
post judgment motions or affidavits which are not timely 
filed are raised too late and may not be considered. 
Franklin Financial vs. New Empire Development Company, 659 
P.2d 1040 (Utah 1983) 
To assist the trial court in determining whether there 
are material issues of fact in dispute, Rule 2.8 of the 
Rules of Practice in the Seventh District Court sets forth 
the procedure that the parties must follow. Rule 2.8(d) 
requires the moving party, in his statement of points and 
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authorities, to set forth a concise statement of material 
facts to which the movant contends no genuine issue exists. 
Those facts must be set forth in separate numbered sentences 
and refer with particularity to the portion of the record 
upon which the moving party relies. Rule 2.8(e) requires 
that any opposing memorandum raising an issue of fact 
describe the disputed facts in separate numbered sentences, 
also referring with particularity to those portions of the 
record upon which the opposing party relies. If a material 
fact is not specifically controverted by the opposing party 
it is deemed admitted for the purpose of summary judgment. 
Ultrasystems complied with Rule 2.8 in its Memorandum 
in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment which cited 
undisputed facts based on specific portions of the record or 
supporting affidavits. Plaintiff did not specifically 
dispute any of the Defendants1 undisputed facts in its 
opposing memorandum. (R. 416) In fact, it admitted most of 
the stated facts, sometimes with unsupported comments, and 
simply stated that it could neither admit nor deny others. 
Plaintiff did list, at page 7 of its Memorandum (R. 
422) three facts it claimed were disputed. Defendants, 
however, do not dispute number 3. The other "disputed" 
facts were conclusory at best and referred to no support in 
the record. The first item Plaintiff claimed to be disputed 
was a claim that Ultrasystems acted in bad faith when it had 
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Richard Armstead prepare the bid. The affidavit of Richard 
Armstead, as well as the depositions of Plaintiff's 
representatives, Mr. Hunt and Mr. Winder, showed there was 
no facts to support a claim of bad faith. (R. 355, Hunt 
deposition page 39, Winder deposition pages 25 and 30) In 
its response to Defendant, Ultrasystems1, Reply Memorandum, 
Plaintiff ultimately agreed that there was no factual issue 
when it admitted that the issue of bad faith was a legal 
question for the court. 
The only other fact Plaintiff contended was in dispute 
was a claim that Plaintiff accepted Ultrasystems bid on 
September 18, 1985. (R. 422) When it was pointed out to 
Plaintiff that its own agent, in its own documents, showed 
that the acceptance occurred September 25, 1985, Plaintiff 
made no further claim that that was a disputed fact. (R. 
355, 360, 408, 409 and Hunt deposition page 20, 27) 
By its present Brief (at page 10) Plaintiff still 
claims that there is an issue of material fact, yet even as 
before the trial court, it fails to state any specific fact 
that is in dispute, or give any citation to the record. 
Plaintiff relies only upon conclusory and unsubstantiated 
allegations that Ultrasystems and its agent, Mr. Armstead, 
acted in bad faith in preparing the bid. Mr. Armstead has 
submitted an uncontroverted Affidavit showing that he acted 
in good faith and that he made an honest mistake in 
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preparing the bid. Furthermore, both of Plaintiff's agents, 
Mr. Hunt and Mr. Winder, stated in depositions that they 
knew of no facts that would show that Mr. Armstead or 
Ultrasystems acted in bad faith, and neither described any 
facts that contradict Mr. Armstead's Affidavit. (Hunt 
deposition page 29, Winder deposition pages 25 and 30) 
When Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment was before 
the trial court, Plaintiff agreed with the Defendants' list 
of undisputed facts and even moved for Summary Judgment on 
those same facts. Plaintiff filed three separate Memoranda 
objecting to Defendants' Motion but furnished no affidavits 
challenging any of the facts relied on by the Defendants. 
Only after the trial court granted Defendants' Motion did 
Plaintiff attempt to raise "issues" by "Supplemental 
Affidavits" and a Motion and Memorandum for a New Trial. 
Only at that late date did Plaintiff claim there were any 
issues of fact. None of those claims, even now, are coupled 
with any specific facts. 
The court determined that Defendants were entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law on the record facts. There are 
no facts in dispute which are material to the issues raised 
in the Motion for Summary Judgment. The ruling by the trial 
court should be sustained. 
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POINT III 
THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD BE SUSTAINED ON ANY 
ONE OF THE THREE SEPARATE AND INDEPENDENT GROUNDS 
RELIED UPON BY THE TRIAL COURT, 
The Defendants sought summary judgment on three 
grounds: 
1. Defendant, Ultrasystems, made an error when it 
submitted its bid. That error was made in good faith, 
without gross negligence and, under the law of State vs. 
Union Construction Company, 339 P.2d 421 (Utah 1959), equity 
should prevent forfeiture of the bid bond. (It is on this 
ground alone that Plaintiff, by continued, unsupported, 
conclusory allegations, seeks to raise issues of fact) 
2. The bond was to assure payment of any actual 
damages incurred by Plaintiff as a result of a withdrawal of 
the bid. The Plaintiff was fully reimbursed for all costs 
incurred as a result of Ultrasystems withdrawal of its bid 
and therefore suffered no damages. Petrovich vs. City of 
Arcadia, 222 P.2d 231 (Cal. 1950) Plaintiff has never 
claimed, either to the trial court or on appeal, that there 
are issues of fact in dispute on this question. 
3. Plaintiff failed to follow the conditions 
precedent for the bond to take effect including furnishing 
evidence that the financing had been firmly committed to 
cover the costs of the project as required by the clear 
language of the bond. Plaintiff has not claimed that there 
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are issues of fact in dispute on this issue. 
The trial court, in its ruling, found that Defendants 
were entitled to judgment of no cause of action on all three 
grounds set forth in the Motion for Summary Judgment. This 
Court can and should sustain the trial court's ruling on any 
or all of those grounds. The Plaintiff's only claim of 
disputed facts is on the first ground alleged in the 
Plaintiff's Motion. Even if this Court were to determine 
that there were disputed facts that were material to that 
issue, this Court should sustain the ruling of the trial 
court on either of the other two grounds. 
A. Ultrasystems' Withdrawal of its Bid was a 
Result of an Error Made in Good Faith. Plaintiff 
was 
has 
of • 
Given Prompt 
Suffered 
the Bid. 
No : 
The: 
Notice 
Loss as 
refore, 
of the Error 
a Result of • 
the Bid Bond 
and Plaintiff 
the Withdrawal 
Should Not Be 
Forfeited. 
In State vs. Union Construction Company, 339 P.2d 421 
(Utah 1959) , the Defendant submitted a bid for the 
construction of five miles of road in Garfield County. 
Defendant also submitted a bid bond deposit of five (5%) 
percent. After the bid was accepted, the Defendant 
determined that it had made an error in the exact route of 
the roadway and refused to perform. The mistake was caused 
by Defendant's agent relying on old stakes which designated 
that the road would go through loose soil rather than a new 
survey which placed the road through a great amount of rock. 
Defendant determined that it would cost an additional 
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TWENTY-NINE THOUSAND DOLLARS ($29,000.00) to construct the 
road on the new survey. Plaintiff was given notice of the 
error two (2) days after the acceptance of the bid. The 
Court refused to allow the forfeiture of the bond and 
stated, 
Equity will relieve against forfeiture of a bid 
bond (a) if the bidder acted in good faith, and 
(b) without gross negligence, (c) if he was 
reasonably prompt in giving notice of the error in 
the bid to the other party, (d) if the bidder will 
suffer substantial detriment by forfeiture, and 
(e) if the other party's status has not been 
greatly changed, and relief from forfeiture will 
work no substantial hardship on him. Id. 421 
See also, New York vs. John W. Rouse Construction 
Company, 274 N.Y.S.2d 981 (1966) (Defendant did not realize 
lock gates were to be fabricated in one piece) ; Clinton 
County Department of Public Works vs. American Bank and 
Trust Company, 268 N.W.2d 367 (Mich. 1978) (Contractor left 
out of his bid calculations the restoration process) and 
Puget Sound Painters, Inc., vs. Washington, 278 P.2d 302 
(Wash. 1954) (Plaintiff misunderstood the calculations 
regarding the length of the bridge towers). 
In the present case Ultrasystems meets all of those 
elements and is entitled to be relieved from forfeiture of 
the bond. Richard Armstead was the employee who prepared 
the bid for Ultrasystems. His specialty involves 
construction of electrical facilities of the type required 
by Plaintiff. He prepared the bid planning on using bolting 
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and coupling as the means to connect the conductors, bus 
bars and terminals. Only after the bid was submitted did he 
learn that Plaintiff wanted the connections made by aluminum 
welding, a more expensive method. The only reference to 
welding was in the materials list. There was no such 
reference on the drawings used to prepare the bid. 
(Armstead Affidavit R. 355) 
Plaintiff admits that there is no evidence that Mr. 
Armstead did not make a mistake and that he did not act in 
good faith. Plaintiff rather contends that Ultrasystems 
acted in bad faith by having Mr. Armstead prepare the bid. 
No facts are cited to support that claim. 
There is no question that prompt notice was given to 
Plaintiff. The error was determined September 24, 1985 and 
written notice was given to Moon Lake on September 25, 1985. 
Likewise, there is no question that Ultrasystems will suffer 
a substantial detriment if the bond is forfeited. Pursuant 
to law and the contract between Ultrasystems and Industrial 
Indemnity Company, Ultrasystems is ultimately liable for any 
payment on the bond. If the Court allows forfeiture on the 
bond as requested by Plaintiff, Ultrasystems will incur a 
detriment in the amount of TWENTY-ONE THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED 
THIRTY DOLLARS ($21,330.00). Finally, there is no question 
that Plaintiff's status has not changed and it has not 
incurred a hardship. In fact, Plaintiff has not been 
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damaged at all as a result of the withdrawal of the bid 
because it has obtained full reimbursement for all costs 
incurred in building the structure, including interest and 
any overtime paid to its employees. 
Plaintiff also argues that Ultrasystems made a mistake 
of law and cites Boise Junior College District vs. Mattefs 
Construction Company, 450 P.2d 604 (Id. 1969) In that case 
the Idaho Court refused to forfeit the bid bond when the 
facts showed the Defendant forgot to include the cost of 
glass in its bid. State vs. Union Construction Company and 
other cases using the same test did not make a distinction 
between mistakes of fact and mistakes of law. Even if that 
were the test, the mistake in this case, like that in Boise 
Junior College, was a mistake of fact. 
Based on the undisputed facts, Ultrasystems meets the 
requirements set forth in State vs. Union Construction 
Company to avoid forfeiture, and was fully entitled to the 
court's Summary Judgment dismissing Plaintiff's action. 
B. The Bond Submitted by Ultrasystems is for 
Payment of Actual Damages Incurred by Plaintiff 
Upon the Withdrawal of Ultrasystems Bid. Since 
Plaintiff Incurred No Damages, it is Entitled to 
No Relief on the Bond. 
The liability of a surety is generally no greater than 
that of the principal Turner vs. Wexler, 538 P. 2d 877 
(Wash. 1975) , and the general rule is that a surety is 
liable only for payment of actual damages caused by the 
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principal. Butler vs. Union Pacific Insurance Company, 509 
P.2d 1184 (Oregon 1973) 
There are two general types of bonds. There are penal 
or penalty bonds and indemnity bonds. If the bend is 
construed to be a penalty bond, then the face amount of the 
bond is forfeited regardless of the amount of damages. If 
the bond is determined to be an indemnity bond, then the 
Plaintiff is entitled to recover the actual damages up to 
the face amount of the bond. To avoid unjust forfeitures 
and windfalls, most bonds are construed to be indemnity 
bonds. 
In General Insurance Company of America vs. City of 
Colorado Springs, 638 P.2d 752 (Colo. 1982), the Court 
stated that a bond is to be interpreted according to the 
standards governing the construction of contracts in general 
and that a determination should be made from the language of 
the instrument itself, together with any collateral 
documents such as the contract. The Court further stated 
that the determination of the type of a bond is a question 
of law. See also, Board of Supervisors of Fairfax County 
vs. Ecology One, 245 S.E.2d 425 (Va. 1978). 
The California Court in Petrovich vs. City of Arcadia, 
222 P.2d 231 (Cal. 1950) considered a case factually similar 
to the present case. Neither the bid nor the invitation for 
bids contained any language declaring that the bond was to 
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be forfeited as liquidated damages. The Court in construing 
the bond as an indemnity bond stated: 
Forfeitures in the nature of penalty are not 
favored; and language must be so construed as to 
avoid a forfeiture if that is possible (citations 
omitted) ... .In the present case we are of the 
opinion that the agreement does not provide for 
either a penalty or liquidated damages since the 
language in relation to the bid bond contained in 
the executed bid form adopts no more than the 
words of guarantee in the bid invitation. Words 
indicating that the full sum of the bond would be 
forfeited or treated as liquidated damages could 
readily have been used. To construe words 
actually used otherwise than in accordance with 
their plain meaning would result in unauthorized 
changes in or additions to the language of the 
instruments and would base the conclusion upon 
uncertain or doubtful inference contrary to the 
language expressly employed. The wording of the 
bid invitation and the executed bid was of the 
city's own choosing and should not be held to 
extend the bidder's and the surety's hazards 
beyond its fair meaning. Id. 236 
The bond submitted by Ultrasystems is similar to the 
bid bond in General Insurance Company of America vs. City of 
Colorado Springs and Petrovich vs. City of Arcadia. The 
language of the bond contains words of guarantee, not 
forfeiture. See Addendum 5. If Moon Lake wanted a penalty 
bond, it could have so requested in the bid documents. The 
August 27, 1985 letter which accompanied the bid documents 
required that a bid bond be furnished, but did not require 
that it be a penalty bond. (Addendum 6, paragraph 4). 
Furthermore, paragraph 5 does not provide for forfeiture of 
the bid bond, but rather provides that it will be enforced 
according to its terms. Some of the bidders did submit a 
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penalty bond as a bid bond. See Thiel bond attached to 
Allred Affidavit as Exhibit "H". (R.406) 
The law in this State does not support forfeiture and 
requires that contracts, such as the bid bond be strictly 
construed to avoid forfeitures. Biesinger vs. Behunin, 584 
P.2d 801 (Utah 1978); Jones vs. Thorvaldson, 392 P.2d 483 
(Utah 1964) Ultrasystems' bid bond indemnified Plaintiff 
against any actual loss in the event Ultrasystems 
unjustifiably withdrew its bid and refused to perform. 
The only damages Moon Lake is entitled to recover under 
the indemnity bond are its actual damages. It is undisputed 
that Moon Lake has suffered no actual damages because of its 
contract with Chevron, and Chevron is not a party to this 
action. 
C. Moon Lake did not Comply with the Conditions 
Precedent for the Bid Bond to Take Effect. 
Prior to the bid bond taking effect and the surety and 
principal being bound thereby, Plaintiff was required not 
only to accept Ultrasystems1 bid, but also to comply with 
certain conditions precedent set forth on the bond. The 
bond contains the following paragraph: 
Provided, however, neither principal not surety 
shall be bound hereunder unless obligee prior to 
execution of the final contract shall furnish 
evidence satisfactory to principal and surety that 
financing has been firmly committed to cover the 
entire cost of the project. (Addendum 5) 
It is undisputed by Plaintiff that no evidence was provided 
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either to the principal or the surety that financing had 
been firmly committed to cover the entire cost of the 
project. (Hunt deposition page 33, Winder deposition pages 
25 and 30) 
The bid document further provides that the bid of 
Ultrasystems had to be accepted and the contract awarded to 
Ultrasystems before the bond would come into effect. In the 
present case, both Plaintiff's acceptance and Ultrasystems1 
notice of error and withdrawal of its bid were submitted at 
the same meeting on September 25, 1985. However, the 
acceptance of the bid by Plaintiff was conditional. The 
acceptance states: 
Subject to the approval of the administrator the 
owner hereby accepts the foregoing proposal of the 
bidder. (R. 409) 
The administrator was the Rural Electric Administration. 
Plaintiff admits that it never obtained the approval of the 
administrator, but argues that since the administrator's 
funds were net involved, its acceptance was not necessary. 
That, however, is not the language of the conditional 
acceptance. Since the acceptance was conditional, 
Ultrasystems clearly withdrew its bid prior to any final 
acceptance of the bid and therefore the bond did not come 
into effect. 
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CONCLUSION 
It is apparent on the foregoing that the Summary 
Judgment dismissing Plaintiff's action, as well as the 
Court's Order denying Plaintiff's Motion for New Trial, must 
withstand Plaintiff's appeal. To the extent Plaintiff's 
appeal challenges the Summary Judgment, it is clearly 
untimely, and the trial court acted fully within prescribed 
law and procedure in not allowing a reconsideration of the 
Judgment, by "new trial" or otherwise. Both Order and 
Judgment should be upheld. 
Respectfully submitted this -^^day of October, 1987. 
NIELSEN & SENIOR 
Attorneys for Respondent 
Ultrasystems Western 
Constructors, Inc. 
^mlQojuJi 
lark B. Allred 
^ X \ C 4 A ^ S J ^ K A A ^ 
McKeachnie 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Respondent 
Industrial Indemnity 
Cqmpany
 > {A ^ 
By: r ^W W#W^ 
Datfid W. Slau^titer 
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ADDENDUM 
CLARK B. ALLRED - 0055 
GAYLE F. McKEACHNIE - 2200 
NIELSEN & SENIOR 
Attorneys for Defendant -
Ultrasystems Western 
Constructors, Inc. 
363 East Main Street 
Vernal, Utah 84078 
Telephone: (801) 789-4908 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DUCHESNE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
MOON LAKE ELECTRIC ASSOCIATION, 
INC., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ULTRASYSTEMS WESTERN 
CONSTRUCTORS, INC., and 
INDUSTRIAL INDEMNITY COMPANY, 
Defendants. 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Cp.vil No. 86-CV-11D 
Defendant Ultrasystems Western Constructors, Inc., pursuant 
to Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure hereby moves the 
Court to enter a summary judgment in its favor, dismissing the 
Plaintiff's Complaint for no cause of action. 
This Motion is brought upon the grounds that there are no 
material issues of fact in dispute and based on those facts 
Defendants are entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. 
Defendants are entitled to an order of dismissal for the 
following reasons: 
1. Defendant, Ultrasystems Western Constructors, Inc., made 
a i i error ii 1 submitting i ts 1 Did. That error was made in good 
faith, without gross negligence and Defendant gave prompt notice 
of the error. Pursuant to State vs. Union Construction Co., 339 
P.2d 421 (Utah 1959), equity should prevent forfeiture of the bid 
bond. 
2. The bond is to guarantee payment of actual damages 
incurred by the Plaintiff. In the present case the Plaintiff 
incurred no damages since Chevron reimbursed Plaintiff for all 
additional costs caused by Ultrasystems withdrawal of i ts bid. 
Petrovich vs. City of Arcadia, 222 P.2d 231 (Cal. 1950). 
3. Plaintiff failed to follow the conditions precedent for 
the bond to take effect, including furnishing evidence that the 
financing has been firmly committed to cover the costs of the 
project as required by the bond and by failing •" > accept 
Ultrasystems bid prior to notice of the error and withdrawal of 
the bid. 
The specific grounds, the facts and law in support of this 
Motion are set forth more fully in the Memorandum supporting this 
Motion. 
DATED this jO day of November, 1986,. 
NIELSEN & SENIOR 
Attorneys Apr Defendant -
Ultrasystems Western 
Constry£jK>rs, Inc. 
Bv: / tt^AVijQli) 
B. A > l r e d ^ 
CLARK B. ALLRED - 0055 
GAYLE F. McKEACHNIE - 2200 
NIELSEN & SENIOR 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Ultrasystems Western 
Constructors, Inc. 
363 East Main Street 
Vernal, Utah 84078 
Telephone: (801) 789-4908 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DUCHESNE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
MOON LAKE ELECTRIC ASSOCIATION 
INC. , 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ULTRASYSTEMS WESTERN 
CONSTRUCTORS, INC., and 
INDUSTRIAL INDEMNITY COMPANY, 
Defendant. 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Ci^il No. 86-CV-11D 
The above captioned matter came before the Court pursuant to 
Motions for Summary Judgment filed by all parties. Defendant, 
Ultrasystems Western Constructors, Inc., filed its Motion for 
Summary Judgment claiming that it is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law on three grounds. Defendant, Industrial Indemnity 
Company, joined in that Motion and moved for summary judgment on 
the same grounds. Plaintiff, Moon Lake Electric Association, 
Inc., in its Memorandum in Opposition to the Defendants1 Motion 
for Summary Judgment also moved for summary judgment. 
T h e De f' e ndant s filed 11 i re e a £ f i davits i n suppo rt of i t s 
Motion together with accompanying Memoranda. The Plaintiff 
submitted Memoranda in support of its position. Defendant, 
Ultrasystems", Memorandum in Support of its Motion for Summary 
Judgment has set forth undisputed facts, which facts are 
supported by the pleadings, the depositions of Kenneth A. Winder 
a n d B r u c e L • H u n t a n d t h e affidavits. The P1 a I n t i f £ h a s n o t 
submitted any affidavits or other documents showing any dispute 
as it relates to those facts. The Court therefore finds that the 
facts, as listed, are undisputed, that they are supported by 
admissible evidence on file and that based on those undisputed 
facts the Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law 
on the grounds set forth in Ultrasystems' Motion for Summary 
Judgment. The Court being fully advised, therefore; 
ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES that: 
1. Defendants1 Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby 
granted and judgment is hereby entered dismissing Plaintiff's 
Complaint with prejudice. 
2. Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby 
denied. 
DATED this ^O day of Janpa^y7"T5^7, 
Richard C. Davidson 
District Judge 
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CLARK B. ALLRED - 0055 
GAYLE F. McKEACHNIE - 2200 
NIELSEN & SENIOR 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Ultrasystems Western 
Constructors, Inc. 
363 East Main Street 
Vernal, Utah 84078 
Telephone: (801) 78«t-4?08 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DUCHESNE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
MOON LAKE ELECTRIC ASSOCIATION, 
I N C . , a U t a h c o r p o r a t i o n , 
P l a i n t i f f , 
v s 
ULTRASYSTEMS WESTERN 
CONSTRUCTORS, I N C . , and 
INDUSTRIAL INDEMNITY, e t a l . , 
D e f e n d a n t s . 
)RDER 
Civil No. 86-CV-11D 
The above captioned matter came before the Court pursuant to 
Plaintiff's Motion for a New Trial. The Court having reviewed 
the Motion and the Memoranda filed in support and in opposition 
of the Motion and being fully advised and having entered its 
Ruling; 
TT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion for New Trial 
is denied. 
DATED this day of March, 1987. 
v'/T 
Dennis Draney 
District Judge 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OP DUCHESNE COUNTY 
'STATE OF UTAH 
MOON LAKE ELECTRIC ASSOCIATION, 
INC., a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs 
ULTRASYSTEMS WESTERN CONSTRUCTORS 
INC. and INDUSTRIAL INDEMNITY et al 
Defendants, 
R U L I N G 
C i v i l No. 86-CV-11D 
The Court having fully considered the pleadings herein rules 
as follows. 
The Court finds no basis under Rule 59 U.R.C.P. for granting 
a new trial when I n fa< i:!: no trial was held. Additionally the 
Court finds nothing in the record which w<j>uld provide grounds 
under Rule 59 or Rule 60 to set aside the Summary Judgment 
granted by the previous judge. The pleadings herein indicate 
that all matters now presented by Plaintiff were considered by 
Judge Davidson prior to the time he signed the final order. 
Therefore, Plaintiff's Motion for a New Trial or to Set 
Aside the Summary Judgment is denied. 
DATED this Z&^Tday of March, 1987. 
BY THE COURT: 
?-^^^o c ^ /l^K^C 
cc: George E. Mangan 
Clark B. Allred 
A. Dennis Norton 
Q s Industrial Indemnity Proposal or Bid Bond 
Company 
Home Office 
Bond No. Y S 8 5 9 - 7 3 0 1 
PremiumS INCLUDED IN BID BO: 
SERVICE UNDERTAKING 
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS: 
THAT ULTRASYSTEMS WESTERN CONSTRUCTORS, INC. 
16845 Von Karman Ave. 
Irvine, Ca. 92714 
(hereinafter called the Principal) as Principal,
 a n d INDUSTRIAL INDEMNITY COMPANY 
a corporation created and existing under the laws of the State of _ 
with its principal office at Q r ^ o o , r . ^ i i f n r m ^ 
as Surety, are held and firmly bound unto 
C a l i f o r n i a 
, (hereinafter called the Surety), 
MOONLAKE ELECTRIC ASSOCIATION, INC. 
188 West 2nd North 
Roosevelt, Utah 84066 
(hereinafter called the Obligee), in the full and just sum 4>f 
TEN PER CENT (10%) OF TOTAL AMOUNT BID Dollars (S 10% ), 
good and lawful money of the United States of America, to the payment of which sum of money well 
and truly to be made, the said Principal and Surety bind themselves, their and each of their heirs, 
executors, administrators, successors and assigns, jointly and severally, firmly by these presents. 
WHEREAS, the Principal herein is submitting a proposal for 
ROOKS CALIFORNIA SUBSTATION 
L o c a t i o n o f p r o j e c t R a n g e l y , C o l o r a d o 
BID DATE: S e p t e m b e r 1 2 , 1985 
NOW, THEREFORE, if the bid or proposal of said Principal shall be accepted, and the contract 
for such work be awarded to the Principal thereupon by the said Obligee, and said Principal shall 
enter into a contract for the completion of said work and furnish bonds as required by law, then this 
obligation shall be null and void, otherwise to remain in full force and effect 
PROVIDED, HOWEVER, neither Principal nor SUrety shall be bound hereunder unless Obligee 
urtor to execution of the final contract shall furnish evidence satisfactory to Principal and Surety that 
•nancing has been firmly committed to cover the entire cost of the project. 
Signed sealed and dated this 11th day of September ,19 85 
ULTRASYSTEMS WESTERN CONSTRUCTORS, INC. 
Z££T^> 
Principal 
INDUSTRIAL INDEMNITY COMPANY 
4 0 0 N L A K E E L E C T R I C ASSOCIATION • PO BOX 278 • 188 WEST 2ND NORTH • ROOSEVELT. UTAH 84066 • PH 722-24J 
August 27, 198b 
Gentlemen: 
Moon Lake Electric Association, Inc. is receiving proposals for 
the construction, including all necessary labor, material, and 
equipment, of the Rooks California Substation: 
1. Bids should be submitted in writing to our Roosevelt Office 
not later than 10:00 a.m. Sept, 1?, 1985, 
2. Proposals must be submitted on the enclosed forms. Bidders 
name, address, license number (if a license is required by the. 
State), and bid opening date and hour must appear on the 
envelope in which the proposal is submitted. 
3. It is the responsibility of the bidder to carefully examine 
all aspects of the project including scope of work, drawings 
and specifications, site and soil conditions, equipment 
required, bonding and contracting requirements, licensing and 
regulatory considerations, general local conditions and all 
other matters that may affect the cost and completion time of 
the project. 
4. Each proposal must be accompanied by a bid bond in an amount 
equal to ten percent (10%) of the bid price. Bid bonds of the 
bidders submitting the three low proposals will be held until 
a proposal is accepted and a satisfactory contractor's bond is 
furnished by the successful bidder. Bid bonds of the three 
low bidders will be returned within sixty (60) days from the 
bid opening date. Bid bonds of the other bidders will be 
returned within ten (10) days from the bid opening date. 
5. The successful bidder will be required to execute two (2) 
additional counterparts of the proposal and to furnish a 
contractor's bond in triplicate in a penal sum not less than 
the contract price. Failure of the bidder to execute such 
counterparts or to furnish contractor's bond within ten (10) 
days after written notification of acceptance of the proposal 
by Moon Lake Electric shall entitle Moon Lake Electric to 
enforce the bid bond in accordance with its terms. 
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6. Project site is on Chevron Oil property. All contractors and 
employees on the site shall be subject to Chevron Oil Company 
regulations. (Refer to copy of Safety Specification 3.31). 
7. Interested parties are invited to a pre-bid meeting which will 
be held at the main Chevron Oil Company Office at the Chevron 
California Site near Rangely, Colorado on September 5, 1985, 
at S:00 a.m.. 
8. Successful bidder will be notified by September 18, 1985. 
Yours truly, 
Bruce Hunt 
Substation Engineer 
/ -
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed four true and correct 
copies of the foregoing Brief of Respondents to George E. 
Mangan, 47 North Second East, Roosej^/t, Utah 84066, on this 
*\v day of October, 1987. 
C^ iafk B". Allred 
